Policy library · Draft 0.7 — tested controls updated; retention timetable approved; other procedures remain drafts · 8 November 2026
Cybersecurity policies
1. Data handling and privacy
Current information: The privacy overview describes service records, cookies, support correspondence and provider processing. Public sample ticks are held only in page memory. The proposed review does not require partner-system access or client financial or loan documents.
Proposed procedure: Before each new use, record the purpose, necessary fields, permitted users, storage providers and retention rule. Collect only information needed for that purpose. Keep an organisation’s client-identity-to-pass mapping within that organisation unless different arrangements have been expressly agreed. Treat pass-linked records and free-text feedback as potentially personal information.
Handle access, correction and privacy concerns through Brian. Verify a requester’s authority proportionately before disclosing records. Do not request sensitive information in ordinary email when a safer method is needed. Review new purposes, integrations or disclosures before implementation.
Still to confirm: The complete data inventory, mailbox retention, provider logs, processing arrangements, and the handling process for privacy requests. The owner identifies the mailbox as Microsoft 365/Office 365 supplied through GoDaddy, accessed with Apple Mail; this does not establish processing location or a retention configuration.
2. Access control
Current implementation: The application separates guide viewing from administration. Time-limited buyer reviews use fixed expiry and protected browser sessions. The source includes authorised administrator checks; Brian confirmed on 7 November 2026 that he alone currently holds administrator access and the owner key. This owner declaration has not been independently audited. On 8 November 2026, Brian enabled ChatGPT account message verification and confirmed a successful fresh Private Safari login using a WhatsApp code. This verifies that account login only; the separate owner-key, remembered owner-session and recovery-access paths still require assessment.
Proposed procedure: Maintain an access register showing each authorised operator, their required role, account or access method, approval date and removal date. Grant only the access needed. Keep owner authority separate from partner viewing; do not give owner credentials to partners. Store credentials and recovery material securely, separate from public documents and guide links.
Review access after any personnel or role change, promptly remove unneeded access, and replace credentials or sessions following suspected compromise. Check all administrative and recovery access paths when assessing MFA; enabling MFA on one account alone does not demonstrate complete administrator MFA coverage.
Still to confirm: The complete technical access inventory, recovery authority, how credentials are held and removed, and MFA coverage across all administrator paths. The successful ChatGPT account test does not establish complete administrator MFA coverage.
3. Retention and deletion
Timetable approved by Brian on 7 November 2026: Pass-linked household and buyer-review usage and feedback records become eligible 30 days after access ends, or after an unused activation window expires. Delete or de-identify at the next weekly review and no later than day 37, unless a documented complaint, security issue, legal obligation or outstanding privacy request requires retention. This replaces the previous three-calendar-month timetable for those records.
Weekly duty: Brian reviews the register each Monday morning, guided by Captain. Record access-end date, eligibility date, final deadline, outcome, operator, completion date and any hold with its next review date. Look ahead for deadlines before the following review, and address overdue records immediately. Missing end dates or uncertain holds require prompt resolution rather than guessed deletion.
Confirm the exact affected records and linked dependencies before action. Use a reviewed deletion or de-identification procedure, verify its result and retain only minimal non-identifying completion information where possible. Active access, unissued stock, continuing staff access, commercial/legal originals and unrelated recovery material are not blanket deletion targets. Provider logs and support correspondence require separate purpose-based schedules.
Backup copies: Include local exports and both device copies in the review. Following verified deletion, create and test a current backup and securely retire older snapshots containing the deleted personal records by the same deadline, unless a justified restricted hold applies. Do not restore deleted records into service: reconcile deletion decisions before recovery. Creating a newer backup alone does not remove data from older files.
Record each hold’s reason, restricted scope, responsible person and next review. Remove it when the need ends and promptly complete the relevant action. The general timetable is not a reason to destroy information subject to an access or correction request.
Implementation status: The weekly reminder and evidence-labelled admin date queue are available. Holds require a manual check. A separate owner-confirmed control can purge eligible revoked SYSTEM TEST usage and records, with persistent completion logging. On 8 November 2026 the first controlled live purge removed usage/browser identifiers and two linked feedback records from one eligible revoked SYSTEM TEST pass, with no replacement records to remove. Administrative metadata was retained and a persistent completion log recorded the action. A fresh saved backup passed decryption, structure and isolated restore checks. Backup rotation remains pending: the latest iPhone copy still needs checking and older exports/backups containing the purged data must be retired before completion is recorded. This test-only pathway does not establish erasure capability for household, purchased or professional-review records; these require separate assessment. No automated deletion or provider-log purge is asserted.
References: OPC retention principle and preserving records subject to a privacy request.
4. Backup and recovery
Current implementation: An owner-authorised manual database export encrypts the backup in the browser. Isolated validation and database restoration tools exist. On 8 November 2026, following the first controlled test-data purge, a fresh encrypted database backup was saved and successfully checked for decryption and structure. Its isolated restore passed record, schema, index, sequence, integrity and relationship checks; the temporary database was discarded without changing live records. The tested file contained 8 tables and 65 records, including 47 passes. Brian confirms copies saved on iPad and iPhone; verification of the latest iPhone copy and retirement of older exports/backups remain pending. Password storage is separate. Full website, hosting and domain recovery remain untested; no off-site separation, automatic daily backup or recovery-time guarantee is asserted.
Proposed procedure: Save an encrypted backup after a working day with issuing, replacement or feedback activity, and before a material data change where appropriate. Verify that the file can be read and keep an independent secure copy; hold its password separately. Record the backup date, location reference, validation outcome and responsible operator without recording the password.
Preserve website source and domain, hosting and credential-recovery arrangements separately. Test restoration in isolation first. Reconcile later issuing, replacements, revocations and current expiry dates; do not re-enable invalid access or extend rights inadvertently. Obtain the owner’s approval for a controlled production recovery.
Still to confirm: Ongoing backup cadence and recordkeeping, device-loss and off-site resilience, an end-to-end website/hosting/domain recovery exercise, and achievable recovery objectives. No automatic daily backup, recovery-point target or recovery-time guarantee is promised.
5. Security and privacy incident response
Current position: Brian Woods is the sole administrator and incident-response lead, as confirmed by the owner on 7 November 2026. No alternate incident contact is appointed. A staffed security operations service, contracted response-time commitment and completed incident exercise have not been verified.
Escalation routes checked on 7 November 2026: For managed Sites platform, access or retention support, start with OpenAI Support. The official Sites administration guidance identifies OpenAI Support for access and retention questions. Include the public site URL, affected operation, date/time, error details and sanitised evidence, omitting passwords, one-time codes and private guide tokens.
Check OpenAI Status and Cloudflare Status for service notices. Cloudflare is underlying infrastructure; direct account-specific support and response options depend on account ownership and plan. No direct VARDESSA Cloudflare technical-support entitlement or SLA has been established. A status page is not a report to support and does not rule out a site-specific incident.
For a New Zealand small-business cyber incident, use the NCSC reporting route for triage and advice. This is separate from provider support and any required privacy-breach notification; it is not a contracted service-restoration guarantee.
For the owner-identified GoDaddy domain and Microsoft 365 email service, use GoDaddy Support. Its published procedures cover domain/account recovery and Microsoft 365 password recovery. These are reference routes, not evidence that VARDESSA’s recovery has been exercised. Any DNS service controlled separately needs its own account route.
Proposed procedure: Record the discovery time, affected service and information, known facts, immediate risks and actions. Promptly alert Brian and relevant technical or hosting support. Contain access proportionately, preserve relevant evidence and avoid destroying logs or exposing further information while investigating.
Assess potential harm and whether the incident is a notifiable privacy breach. Where notification is required, notify the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and affected people as soon as practicable, subject to applicable exceptions. OPC’s 72-hour expectation is guidance, not a universal statutory deadline. Do not wait for a final forensic report before taking required notification steps. Record decisions and reassess them as facts change.
Coordinate necessary partner communications, provide verified updates, restore from a known good state after checking access and data integrity, and document lessons and follow-up actions. Agree incident contacts and any contractual notification obligations before a wider partner rollout.
Still to confirm: The owning account’s support entitlements, actual account-recovery tests, DNS account control, incident recordkeeping and a practice exercise. The owner identifies GoDaddy for domain registration and Microsoft 365/Office 365 email and confirms an accessible GoDaddy recovery email separate from the business mailbox. Published GoDaddy support and recovery routes have been checked; no reset or recovery was performed. Brian is the confirmed lead; the alternate role remains unassigned. Public support routes have been checked, but no support request or response test has been performed. No paid incident-response engagement, guaranteed response time or continuous AI monitoring is asserted.
References: OPC breach management and NotifyUs.
6. Secure changes and supplier review
Current evidence: Website source and releases are versioned. The hosted guide uses OpenAI ChatGPT Sites and Cloudflare infrastructure. The owner also identifies GoDaddy as domain registrar and Microsoft 365/Office 365 through GoDaddy as business email, read using Apple Mail. This does not by itself establish a supplier certification, contractual assurance or data-residency guarantee.
Proposed procedure: Record a change’s purpose, data and access impact, validation and release reference. Keep secrets out of source and public documents. Test changes to protected access, expiry, data handling and recovery with isolated test records before release; retain a safe rollback plan. Review dependency updates and significant security advisories.
Maintain a supplier register covering purpose, data processed, relevant terms, locations, retention, incident contacts and exit arrangements. Assess the applicable overseas-processing and disclosure arrangements before adding data or providers. Obtain specialist advice when needed; overseas storage and disclosure are not assumed to be legally identical.
Still to confirm: Supplier terms and locations applicable to this account, provider-log and backup arrangements, a routine maintenance owner and cadence, and any independent testing required by a partner.
Reference: OPC — sending information overseas and cloud providers.
Adoption and evidence
These draft procedures need owner confirmation, assigned responsibilities and practical verification before they are described as routine operational controls. Review them before a wider client rollout and following a material change or incident. Partner-specific obligations must be agreed separately.
Return to control status and outstanding checks · Contact Brian